The print edition of ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & RANDY HERTZ, TRIAL MANUAL 7 FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES is now available for purchase from Amazon. The three volumes are listed separately seriatim in the “Books” section of the Amazon website. If you want to buy the entire book, be sure to put all three volumes in your cart. The price for all three is down to $38.00 plus tax and shipping.
The American Law Institute is in the final stages of publishing the seventh edition of ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & RANDY HERTZ, TRIAL MANUAL 7 FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES. Lawyers in public defender offices, nonprofit legal services offices, and pro bono criminal practice can obtain a free copy of the .pdf version of the manual for downloading from the ALI website by filling out the form at https://www.ali.org/trial-manual/
Although the book is a trial manual, not a postconviction manual, it does cover all of the criminal-procedure issues that arise in pretrial and trial proceedings – from Faretta admonitions through inflammatory prosecutorial closing argument, jury misconduct, and posttrial motions – which are the grist of substantive postconviction guilt-phase claims. It is an invaluable resource for attorneys specializing in capital postconviction litigation. Note, however, that the manual’s treatment of the penalty phase of capital cases – and of capital cases as such – is cursory. This is meant to convey the message that capital defense is a specialty and should be conducted by learned counsel or under the supervision of learned counsel. A hard copy of the manual will be available in the near future for those who do not qualify to receive the free copy.
TRIAL MANUAL 7 FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES
by Anthony G. Amsterdam and Randy Hertz
The Trial Manual 7 for the Defense of Criminal Cases is a guidebook for criminal defense lawyers at the trial level. It covers the information a defense attorney has to know, and the strategic factors s/he should consider, at each of the stages of the criminal trial process. It is
On June 21, 2022, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Shoop v. Twyford, a death penalty case out of Ohio where a federal district court in habeas corpus proceedings had issued an order allowing the transportation of Mr. Twyford to a medical facility for neurological testing and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals had affirmed the order. The Supreme Court ruled:
A transportation order that allows a prisoner to search for new evidence is not “necessary or appropriate in aid of” a federal court’s adjudication of a habeas corpus action, 28 U. S. C. §1651(a), when the prisoner has not shown that the desired evidence would be admissible in connection with a particular claim for relief. Because the District Court entered such an order despite Twyford’s failure to make the required showing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming that order is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
On June 21, 2022, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Shoop v. Twyford, a death penalty case out of Ohio where a federal district court in habeas corpus proceedings had issued an order allowing the transportation of Mr. Twyford to a medical facility for neurological testing and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals had affirmed the order. The Supreme Court ruled:
A transportation order that allows a prisoner to search for new evidence is not “necessary or appropriate in aid of” a federal court’s adjudication of a habeas corpus action, 28 U. S. C. §1651(a), when the prisoner has not shown that the desired evidence would be admissible in connection with a particular claim for relief. Because the District Court entered such an order despite Twyford’s failure to make the required showing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming that order is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The Supreme Court issued its decision in Shinn v. Martinez Ramirez, 596 U.S. ___, 2022 WL 1611786 (May 23, 2022), holding that the equitable rule announced in Martinez v. Ryan providing that ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel can provide “cause” to forgive the procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance by trial counsel does not permit a federal court to dispense with 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)’s narrow limits on federal evidentiary hearings even where a prisoner’s state postconviction counsel was at fault for failing to develop the state-court record on the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim.
On April 25, 2022, the Supreme Court granted Texas death row inmate Rodney Reed's certiorari petition. The question presented is:
In Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 524-25 (2011), this Court held that state prisoners may pursue post-conviction claims for DNA testing of crime-scene evidence in a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court made clear that a prisoner bringing such a § 1983 claim may seek “to show that the governing state law denies him procedural due process” after he has unsuccessfully sought DNA testing under available state procedures. Id. at 525, 530.
The question presented is whether the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim seeking DNA testing of crime-scene evidence begins to run at the end of state court litigation denying DNA testing, including any appeals (as the Eleventh Circuit has held), or whether it begins to run at the moment the state trial court denies DNA testing, despite any subsequent appeal (as the Fifth Circuit, joining the Seventh Circuit, held below).
The Supreme Court announced in Brown v. Davenport, 596 U.S. ___ (April 21, 2022), that when a state court has ruled on the merits of a state prisoner’s claim and found a constitutional error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, a federal court cannot grant habeas relief without applying both the test outlined in Brecht and the one Congress prescribed in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) of AEDPA. Assuming here that the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals was correct in its conclusion that the prisoner satisfied Brecht as to his claim of unconstitutional shackling, it cannot be said that the Michigan court unreasonably applied Chapman when it found that the prosecution had established the prisoner's shackling was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Supreme Court has issued its decision in Ramirez v. Collier, ruling that under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), John Ramirez was entitled to a preliminary injuction ordering Texas to permit Ramirez's long-time pastor to pray with him and lay hands on him while he is being executed. Therefore, if Texas reschedules Ramirez’s execution and declines to permit audible prayer or religious touch, the District Court should enter appropriate preliminary relief. If that happens, Texas can then attempt to justify its position by establishing a compelling state interest that cannot be acheived by a less-restrictive alternative. The Supreme Court observed, in closing:
Further proceedings on remand, if necessary, might shed additional light on Texas’s interests, and on whether its policies are narrowly tailored. But such proceedings might also contribute to further delay in carrying out the sentence. The State will have to determine where its interest lies in going forward.
The Supreme Court has issued a 6-3 decision reversing the First Circuit Court of Appeals opinion that had vacated Dzhokhar Tsarnaev's death sentences in the Boston Marathon bombing case. United States v. Tsarnaev, 595 U.S. ___ (March 4, 2022). The Supreme Court began by rejecting the First Circuit's conclusion that the District Court had abused its discretion during jury selection by declining to ask about the kind and degree of each prospective juror's media exposure, as required by First Circuit precedent. The Supreme Court observed that it "has held many times that a district court enjoys broad discretion to manage jury selection, including what questions to ask prospective jurors" and that "a reviewing court may set aside a district court’s questioning only for an abuse of discretion." The Supreme Court then held that "a court of appeals cannot supplant the district court’s broad discretion to manage voir dire by prescribing specific lines of questioning, and thereby circumvent a well-established standard of review." (The dissent in this case by Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Kagan and in all but one part by Justice Sotomayor, did not reach this issue.)
The second basis for invalidating the death sentences had been the First Circuit's finding that the District Court abused its discretion during sentencing when it excluded evidence concerning the possible involvement by Tsarnaev's older brother in an earlier triple-murder. The defense theory was that Tsarneav's now deceased brother had been the mastermind behind the Boston bombing crimes and that Tsarnaev was pressured into assisting him. The earlier murders, according to the defense, provided evidence of the older brother's domineering nature. The primary proof that the older brother had committed the triple homicide was a statement made to investigating officers by a person who was killed shortly thereafter by the investigating officers. The District Court granted the prosecution's motion to exclude any reference to the triple murder, finding that the available information was “without any probative value” and “would be confusing to the jury and a waste of time.” The Supreme Court majority concluded that the District Court's ruling was reasonable and there was no Eighth Amendment violation in the application of the statutory provision allowing exclusion of information if "its probative value is outweighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury." Justice Breyer, with Justices Kagan and Sotomayor, dissented, finding that the reasons provided by the District Court did not justify excluding the triple-murder evidence, and it was an abuse of discretion to do so.
On January 27, 2022, United States District Court Judge Karon Owen Bowdre of the Northern District of Alabama issued a Memorandum Order finding that Cory Maples was entitled to habeas corpus relief on his claim of ineffective assistance by trial counsel at the penalty phase of his Alabama capital trial. The grant of relief came after an evidentiary hearing was ordered by the Eleventh Circuit in Maples v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 729 F. App’x 817 (11th 2018). The case is Maples v. Dunn, 5:03-cv-02399-KOB.
