2024 Term Decisions of Interest to Capital Habeas Practitioners
Gutierrez v. Saenz, 605 U.S. ___ (June 26, 2025). Texas death row inmate Gutierrez has standing to bring his §1983 claim challenging Texas’s postconviction DNA testing procedures under the Due Process Clause notwithstanding the statement by Saenz that any declaratory judgment by the federal court would not affect his ultimate willingness to turn over the evidence Gutierrez sought to have tested. “That a prosecutor might eventually find another reason . . . to deny a prisoner’s request for DNA testing does not vitiate [the prisoner’s] standing to argue that the cited reasons violated his rights under the Due Process Clause.” And that Saenz had already refused the DNA request after the district court’s declaratory judgment had been issued did not render the case moot. “[A] procedural due process claim like the one Gutierrez presses is not mooted by the defendant’s mid-appeal promise that, no matter the result of a lawsuit, the ultimate outcome will not change. Holding otherwise would allow all manner of defendants to manufacture mootness by ensuring that, no matter what procedures a court requires the defendant to employ, the same substantive outcome will result.
Rivers v. Guerrero, 605 U.S. ___ (June 12, 2025). In general, once a district court enters its judgment with respect to a first filed habeas petition, a second-in-time habeas filing qualifies as a “second or successive application” properly subject to the requirements of §2244(b) even when the appeal from the denial of the first filed habeas petition remains pending in the appellate court. For various reasons, the Court declines to address the argument that second-in-time filings that request amendment of the initial habeas petition under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not qualify as second or successive filings under §2244(b).
Glossip v. Oklahoma, 604 U.S. ___, 2025 WL 594736 (Feb. 25, 2025). Oklahoma death row inmate was entitled to a new trial as a result of a Napue violation--the trial prosecutor failed to correct the false testimony by the key witness against Glossip about the reason the witness was prescribed lithium in the county jail. (The prescription was for an undisclosed bipolar disorder, rather than having been provided to the witness in response to a request for cold medication, as the witness falsely claimed at trial.) Although the claim was denied on procedural grounds by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, its decision was nevertheless subject to review by the Supreme Court because the state court’s decision to apply a procedural bar depended on its antecedent rejection of the state attorney general’s confession of Napue error, which was based solely on federal law.
Andrew v. White, 604 U.S. ___, 145 S.Ct. 75 (Jan. 21, 2025) (per curiam). In Oklahoma death penalty case where the prosecution was allowed to present concededly irrelevant evidence at both phases of the trial about petitioner's sex life and her failings as a wife and mother, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals erred when it concluded there was no clearly established Supreme Court rule that the erroneous admission of prejudicial evidence could violate due process. "By the time of Andrew's trial, this Court had made clear that when 'evidence is introduced that is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a mechanism for relief.' Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991)." Although federal habeas courts must extend deference to a state court's application of Supreme Court precedent, federal courts have an "independent obligation to first identity the relevant 'clearly established Federal law.'" (Citation omitted.) The case is remanded to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals to determine whether the Oklahoma court's decision denying petitioner's claim of constitutional error was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of the clearly established law.
Hamm v. Smith, 604 U.S. ___, 145 S.Ct. 9 (2024) (per curiam). In Alabama death penalty case where the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that Smith was intellectually disabled, and therefore ineligible for execution under Atkins, the Commissioner's certiorari petition is granted, the Eleventh Circuit's decision is vacated, and the case is remanded for further consideration of its analysis of the first prong of the intellectual disability test. There were two ways the Eleventh Circuit's decision could be interpreted. In the first, the appeals court was adopting a per se rule that the lower end of the standard-error range for an offender's lowest IQ score was dispositive for prong one. Alternatively, the decision could be read as utilizing "a more holistic approach to multiple IQ scores that considers the relevant evidence, including as appropriate any relevant expert testimony." The Supreme Court's ultimate assessment of the certiorari petition could depend on the actual basis for the Eleventh Circuit's finding on prong one.