The following pending petitions involve issues of interest to capital habeas litigators:
(1) The undisputed facts show that Orleans Parish District Court Judge Frank Marullo was a witness in the police investigation relating to the likely murder weapon in this case. Judge Marullo was alleged to have signed the order that released a 9mm gun from police evidence to Petitioner’s codefendant—a gun that was likely then used to murder a police officer and two civilians. During the investigation, Judge Marullo denied signing the order and maintained that his signature had been forged. Judge Marullo subsequently presided over Petitioner’s trial and chose not to disclose the investigation, his involvement in it, or his alleged association with the weapon. He continued his nondisclosure even though the release of the weapon was relevant to Petitioner’s defense.
Following this Court’s GVR in light of Rippo v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 905, 907 (2017) (summarily reversing denial of judicial recusal claim), the Louisiana Supreme Court acknowledged that Judge Marullo had an objectively ascertainable self-interest in avoiding disclosure of his alleged connection to the likely murder weapon: “Realistically, the average judge would be vigilant to avoid being unjustly associated with any wrongdoing surrounding the release of the possible murder weapon” and “harbor some sensitivity about” that association. But the court concluded a judge may constitutionally preside despite such self-interest in the case before him—without even disclosing it—and limited this Court’s recusal standard to cases involving bias specifically “for or against” a party.
The first question presented is whether Judge Marullo’s failure to recuse, or even disclose, violated Petitioner’s rights under the Due Process Clause.
In McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (1984), this Court announced a test for obtaining a new trial where it is learned that a juror failed to disclose a material fact at voir dire: “[A] party must first demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire, and then further show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.” Id. at 556. In this case concerning the murder of a police officer and two civilian siblings, two empaneled jurors—each asked multiple times about any connections to law enforcement—withheld that they were, in fact, career-long law enforcement employees. One was present in the 911 dispatch room at the time of the call for this particular murder and personally attended the victim officer’s funeral. A third juror, asked multiple times if she had relatives who were victims of violent crime, did not disclose that her own two siblings had been murdered.
As Respondent previously conceded before this Court, lower courts are entrenched in a deep split on the second and third questions raised by this case:
(2) Under McDonough, does demonstrating “a valid basis for a challenge for cause” require a showing that the juror would have been subject to mandatory disqualification or that a reasonable judge would have granted a challenge for cause?
(3) Does the McDonough test apply only to a juror’s deliberate concealment or does it also apply to misleading omissions?
Click here to view the certiorari petition. The case was distributed for the June 21, 2018 conference. On June 11, 2018, the record was requested.
In a series of decisions, this Court has provided guidance to lower courts evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a capital case where trial counsel failed to provide effective representation during the sentencing phase. Lower courts have struggled to implement that guidance, especially when evaluating whether, as a result of the inadequate representation, the defendant was denied his constitutional right to an individualized determination of culpability. This petition presents an important question of whether the failure to conduct any investigation or offer any evidence of a capital defendant’s significant mental health impairments at the penalty phase can be nonprejudicial. The questions presented are:
(1) Whether it was objectively unreasonable for the Georgia Supreme Court to find no prejudice resulted from the failure of defense counsel to conduct any investigation and to present any mitigating evidence, including readily available and undisputed expert testimony that the defendant suffered from significantly diminished mental capacity constituting dementia at the time of the crime, when these failures deprived the jury of mitigating evidence that was essential to an individualized determination of the defendant’s culpability. (2) Whether prejudice must be presumed in a death penalty case when defense counsel fails to conduct any investigation of potential mitigating evidence, fails to offer any evidence during the penalty phase, and fails to subject the state’s penalty phase witnesses to any cross-examination, thereby undermining the adversarial system and depriving the defendant and the fact-finder of any meaningful opportunity to conduct an individualized determination of the defendant’s culpability.
Click here to view the certiorari petition. The case was distributed for the June 7, 2018 conference. On June 1, the record was requested. The case has been redistributed for the September 24, 2018 conference.
Jones v. Oklahoma, 17-6943 (cert. petition filed Nov. 28, 2017)
(case below: unpublished order (Okla. Crim. App.))
Julius Jones, an African American prisoner, was sentenced to death in the State of Oklahoma for the 1999 shooting-death of Paul Howell, a white male, in Edmond, Oklahoma.
In 2017, after the conclusion of Mr. Jones’ state and federal collateral proceedings, the results of a statistical study on race and capital sentencing patterns in Oklahoma were first published. The study found that non-whites accused of killing white males are statistically more likely to receive a sentence of death in Oklahoma on that basis alone, and controlling for other aggravating circumstances.
Under Oklahoma’s post-conviction statute, a death-sentenced prisoner has just sixty days to file a successor post-conviction application based upon newly-discovered evidence. In compliance with this rule, Mr. Jones filed a post-conviction application in the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (“OCCA”) wherein he argued that this study constituted newly-discovered evidence that he was convicted and sentenced to death in violation of his rights under the Oklahoma Constitution, as well as under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. The OCCA denied Mr. Jones’ successor application on the basis of a state procedural bar.
The questions presented by this case are the following: (1) Whether a complex statistical study that indicates a risk that racial considerations enter into Oklahoma’s capital sentencing determinations proves that Mr. Jones’ death sentence is unconstitutional under the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution? (2) Whether Oklahoma’s capital post-conviction statute, specifically Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 1089(D)(8)(b), and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals’ application of the statute in Mr. Jones’ case, denies Mr. Jones an adequate corrective process for the hearing and determination of his newly-available federal constitutional claim in violation of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses?
Click here to view the certiorari petition. (The same questions have been presented in Wood v. Oklahoma, 17-6891.) The case was originally distributed for the March 2, 2018. It was then redistributed for the March 16, 23, 29, April 13, 20, 27, May 10, 17, 24, 31, June 7, 14, and 21 conferences.